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9 August 1948

**MEMORANDUM TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**THROUGH: The Executive for Inspection and Security**

**SUBJECT: Inspection of FBIS Operations in Cairo**

**I. AUTHORITY**

1. In accordance with instructions from the Executive for Inspection and Security, visits were made to the Mediterranean Bureau, FBIS, Cairo, Egypt, during the periods 11-17 and 23-27 June 1948.

2. The Findings and Recommendations of this report are contained in Sections II and III.

**II. FINDINGS**

4. Supervision of seventy-eight native and foreign national employees engaged in operational functions is inadequate due to the small number of American employees (four) and the preoccupation of the Chief of the Bureau with administrative details.

5. Lack of ability of many employees to perform three phases of monitoring process, namely, monitoring, translating and typing, slows and makes costly the operations of this bureau.

6. The number of native and foreign national employees is in excess of the authorized allotment.

7. Complete settlement of claims of five employees discharged in March for security reasons had not been made. Such settlement, when made, will give these employees benefits in excess of legal requirements and of benefits paid American employees.

8. Administrative matters are well handled. Property, motor vehicles and fiscal records are well maintained with only a few minor discrepancies noted.

9. Some unserviceable and surplus property was noted at the Outpost.

10. Forms used in operations of motor vehicles and in accounting for costs and reporting accidents are not similar to standard CIA and Bureau of the Budget forms used in the Washington area.

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11. Intelligence report received 17 June 1948 from the Assistant Naval Attache indicated six employees might not be eligible for continued employment for security reasons.

12. The Pay Clerk and Property Control Clerk, foreign nationals, are both aware of CIA-FBIS connection by nature of forms they use in their work. Whether other natives or foreign nationals have this information is not known but it is logical to assume they do.

13. American personnel of the Mediterranean Bureau are very security conscious. The handling and safe guarding of classified documents and physical security of buildings occupied are particularly well done.

14. Upon departure of the present Chief of Bureau for the United States there will be no one in the Bureau skilled in changing combinations of combination locks.

15. Personnel files of the Bureau contain valuable information concerning past and present native and foreignnational employees.

16. Detailed and explicit instructions as to duties of Bureau security officers, security and disaster plans and measures should be prepared by the Security Branch for the guidance of the Chiefs of FBIS installations.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that:

17. Working schedules of the Chief of Bureau and Editorial Specialists be rearranged to provide the greatest possible amount of supervision of operational personnel. To effect this recommendation the Chief of the Bureau should rid himself of practically all administrative details.

18. Another editor be added to the American staff as necessary to implement a complete schedule of operational supervision.

19. Authorized allotment of native and foreign nationals be increased to correspond to the number on duty as indicated on the current payroll.

20. Future employment contracts with native and foreign national employees of FBIS field installations contain legal minimum benefits, if any, required by the laws of the particular country in lieu of annual and sick leave benefits as afforded American employees. Otherwise, provisions for American employees should prevail as regards annual and sick leave, notice of dismissal and repatriation.

21. Prior to closing of the Mediterranean Bureau, inventory of equipment and supplies on hand be sent to Cyprus for study and

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selection of desired items, in the event transportation of such material to Cyprus through the Military Attache at Cairo can be arranged.

22. A survey be made of property at the Outpost with a view to disposing of surplus and unserviceable items to the Foreign Liquidation Commission.

23. In order to standardise maintenance of vehicle operating, cost and accident records a supply of pertinent CIA and Bureau of the Budget forms should be forwarded to the Mediterranean Bureau.

24. Due to serious effect discharges would have on operations, employees named in the intelligence report received from the Assistant Naval Attache on 17 June 1948 be retained subject to surveillance pending receipt of information as to reliability of source and fuller details.

25. All printed forms and other material which may be used by native or foreign national employees be sterile as regards CIA. This should be carried into the preparation of Administrative Instructions, General Orders, Notices and all other administrative memoranda or material.

26. Administrative Officer be instructed by the Chief of the Bureau in the changing of combinations of combination locks. Future Administrative Officers sent out to field installations by FBIS be instructed in Washington prior to departure.

27. When the Mediterranean Bureau is closed at Cairo all personnel files, other than those for employees being transferred to Cyprus, be forwarded to the Executive for Inspection and Security, Washington, for inclusion in agency security files.

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